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Abstract. Scholars have offered many conflicting interpretations of the Japanese Meiji
Restoration of 1868, but few have put forth a comprehensive analysis as to the nature of
the protagonists and the motivation of those who initiated this revolutionary movement.
Although historical interpretations of the Restoration and its heroes have ranged from a
romantic and generalized theory of economic struggle to focused studies of individuals
whose motivations were singular, the true character of the samurai revolutionaries behind
the Restoration is the issue here. Of those samurai who, acquired knowledge of Western
civilization and technology, took part in the Restoration, and witnessed the death knell of
feudalism, the Restoration revolutionaries stood apart from their samurai brethren and
acted to lay the groundwork for a modern political system to replace it.

On January 3, 1868, Keiki (Yoshinobu), the fifteenth shogun of the Tokugawa
bakufu (shogunate) surrendered sovereignty to the fifteen-year-old Meiji emperor,
Mutsuhito, who had just succeeded his father, the Emperor Komei when he died early in
1867. This event marked not only the end of the longest shogunate in Japan, which lasted
for over two hundred sixty years, but the beginning of a new, democratic Japan modeled
after the European constitutional monarchies. This smooth political transformation,
achieved without much bloodshed, known as the Meiji Restoration, has attracted the
close attention of both Japanese historians and Western scholars. One of the most
intriguing questions is what is the nature of those Japanese who instigated this
revolution? Furthermore, what is the social, political, economic, and intellectual
background of the Japanese who carried it out? This paper will attempt at
reinterpretation on the nature of these Restoration leaders, who played leading roles in the
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transformation of Japan from the feudal age to the modern era. It will first analyze and
evaluate systematically the various, and often conflicting, interpretations that have been
advanced since the successful completion of the Meiji Restoration. The paper will then
suggest a new, fresh interpretation on the subject.

In 1940, E. Herbert Norman published his Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State1
and advanced a convincing interpretation on the Japanese revolutionaries. Drawing upon
the works of Japanese economic scholars of the 1920’s and 1930’s, Norman argues that
the Restoration was the work of “lower samurai” with full cooperation of the chonin
(merchants) of Osaka and Kyoto. Norman’s analysis of the partnership that formed
among these lower samurai, the merchants, and eventually the “outside” tozama daimyo
(lords) begins with the economic challenges facing the “lower samurai” that spurred
them to rebellion in the first place. As members of the lowest class of samurai, Norman
points out, these leaders of the Restoration had endured the brunt of excessive feudal
taxation and the subsequent manipulation of their livelihood by their daimyo. Without
any means to escape this destitution, “the more restless spirits among them” fled their
han (domain) to become ronin (wandering men). These ronin settled in the major cities
including Edo (Tokyo), where, together with their lower samurai counterparts, trained in
Western languages and science, becoming the intellectual forerunners in foreign
knowledge and “the most ardent champions of Restoration.”2
It was against this backdrop, Norman argues, that a “political struggle” developed,
triggering the lower samurai to “turn against the rigid clan system which thwarted their
1
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2
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ambitions and jeopardized their social security.” The “corrosive of economic
uncertainty” in Tokugawa Japan “destroyed the fabric of feudal loyalties” and forced the
lower samurai to “search for some higher, more universal symbol worthy of devotion and
sacrifice.”3 The bakufu’s continuous policy of keeping the emperor isolated in Kyoto
“was such as to evoke the most passionate feelings of loyalty” among the lower samurai
and ronin with respect to the theory that the emperor was the real “source of all power.”4
Hence, “the breakdown of feudalism in Japan released latent social forces” into “the
hands of the lower samurai, who gradually superseded the upper ranks of samurai and
feudal lords as the political spokesmen of the day.”5 Their revolutionary political
philosophy, which included the facilitation of cooperation between the privileged and
lower classes, and their assumption of political leadership, would, concludes Norman,
serve the lower samurai well when it actually came time for them to instigate a
movement to remove the shogunate from power and restore the emperor to hegemony.
Norman describes the typical “lower samurai” as earning one-third of the annual
rice stipend of the “middle samurai.” He further compares this typical “samurai” income
as equivalent to that earned by an average “peasant.”6 Those typical “lower samurai,”
who earned only what an average peasant earned and had little opportunity to increase
their earnings under the feudal system, were clearly distinguishable from the middleranking samurai in rank and in income.
The meager wages earned by the “lower samurai,” however, were a reflection of
the financial difficulty faced by the daimyo during the Tokugawa period. The average
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stipend of the “lower samurai” had decreased precipitously because his daimyo had
“borrowed” a portion of his stipend to comply with bakufu laws. Rather than wallow in
poverty, many of the lower samurai set off to the major cities, often without the
permission of their daimyo, becoming sometimes ronin, to congregate with other lower
samurai and ronin, “who, thanks to their freedom from clan interference and duties,”
were able to study the sciences and ideas of the West.”7
This is the reason why the ronin and their lower samurai counterparts became
“the spear-point in the attack upon the Bakufu,” Norman suggests, and were able to
“rouse Japan to consciousness.”8 These revolutionaries, acting in the interests of all the
Japanese lower classes, struck a chord concerning their plight under the Tokugawa feudal
system. The daimyo were unable to lead the Restoration movement, insists Norman,
because they were preoccupied with other matters. Norman admits that the feudal lords
did contribute significantly to the Restoration, to be sure, but the Restoration might have
been delayed or even ended in failure without the leadership of the lower samurai.
Norman suggests that the lower samurai were the only ones who could have coordinated
and, ultimately, carried out a successful Restoration movement. Their forward-looking
vision to a new system of government was, indeed, motivated by their deep desire to
upend the inequities of the feudal system.9
Norman points out that the chonin also played an important role in the Restoration.
Since inception of the seclusion policy in the late 1630’s, the chonin had been unable to
find new markets to increase their capital. The chonin, whose livelihood was regulated by
the laws of the shogun, who regarded them as ”immoral and usurious,” had nonetheless,
7
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managed to accumulate a surplus of cash and specie which were in turn loaned to the
feudal clans in exchange for a domain’s main staple commodity, rice. Although the
chonin were virtually powerless to effect economic reform in the feudal society on their
own,10 they were often able to manipulate rates of exchange or monopolize commodity
markets, eliciting “the ill-concealed animosity of the bakufu.” Many chonin, therefore,
were willing to support the lower samurai and the daimyo in their pursuit of defeating the
Tokugawa government.11
The chonin, members of the lowest class, were willing to finance the hard-pressed
daimyo and, in many cases, the lower samurai in their plot to overthrow the Tokugawa
shogunate because of their desire to throw off the shackles of the oppressive Tokugawa
bakufu. As this alliance began forming, many chonin were able, either through the
purchase of the samurai status or the adoption of samurai as their sons, to become
members of the samurai class.12 This served the needs of both classes, because the
chonin needed protection from the samurai and, conversely, some samurai needed
valuable financial backing for their revolutionary activities. Norman emphatically asserts
that the “lower samurai – often chonin in the position of samurai – were the most
conscious leaders in the movement to overthrow the Bakufu.”13 This alliance of lower
samurai and chonin, while “slipping through the meshes of the feudal system,” was
mainly the result of the alienation of the chonin class by the Tokugawa bakufu.14
The chonin of Osaka, the major marketing clearinghouse of the bakufu, where
seventy-percent of Japan’s wealth was concentrated, became the major financiers of the
10
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Meiji Restoration. Though the coalition between the chonin and “lower samurai and
ronin” was significant, they could not have overthrown the Bakufu only “by the sharpness
of their swords or the daring of their resolve.”15 The major southwestern tozama daimyo
of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen, Norman argues, were involved in forming such a
trust with the chonin. Not only were the bakufu’s oppressive regulations aimed at the
chonin but, by virtue of their position as tozama (outside lords), the daimyo often were
the target of restrictive laws, like the sankin-kotai (alternate attendance) system, aimed at
weakening their will and finances, requiring them to spend alternate years in Edo and
upon their departure to leave their wives and family behind as hostages. The
southwestern daimyo, still in control of their han, despite the hardships perpetrated on
them by the bakufu, actively sought out the financial services of the major Osaka chonin
in an effort to relieve their financial stress. The lower samurai and their daimyo, Norman
asserts, were willing to provide the military muscle to overthrow the bakufu but expected
the chonin “to finance the political movement against the bakufu,”16 which preceded the
Restoration Civil War.17
Thus Norman considers the daimyo another crucial agent of the Restoration. The
daimyo, finding their domains crumbling financially under the strain of Tokugawa highhanded policies had no choice but to borrow heavily from merchants, which forced them
to become deeply indebted to the rich chonin. The chonin, however, Norman argues,
could not afford to press the daimyo for timely repayment of these debts, as the chonin
might need the daimyo’s favor in the future. More to the point, “the interests of the
feudal ruling class and the big merchants became so closely intertwined that whatever
15
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hurt one necessarily injured the other.”18 This relationship between the top class daimyo
and the bottom class chonin had been formed well before the downfall of the Tokugawa
shogunate.
When the Tokugawa Ieyasu set up a military dictatorship over Japan after the
Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, he rewarded those daimyo who had declared their
allegiance to him prior to the battle (fudai daimyo). Ieyasu also remembered those
southwestern daimyo who opposed him, such as Shimazu of Satsuma, Mori of Choshu,
and others (tozama daimyo). Some of these tozama daimyo continued to wage a losing
battle to fight off the tyranny of the Tokugawa bakufu. The bakufu, through such policies
as the sankin-kotai system, the passport system of traveling between domains, the spy
networks to enforce compliance, and the arbitrarily imposed public works projects,19
imposed heavy financial burdens on the tozama daimyo, not easily relieved, sending them
into the hands of the chonin to form the mutual alliance between them.
At the time Commodore Perry kicked the Japanese door open, the Tokugawa
shogun, which had been the dominant samurai overlord for over two and one half
centuries, began to lose its governing strength, as the spirits of the tozama daimyo, their
retainers, and the lower samurai were boosted. This hegemonic decline was also a signal
of the decline of the entire feudal system. Scrambling to adapt to the changing times, the
lower samurai, newly educated in the Western forms of government and philosophy, and
chonin methods of finance, returned to their domains and became “the actual leaders in
clan affairs.”20

18
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In the great anti-bakufu domains, Norman insists, these samurai performed a vital
function, by working in concert with those of others, taking virtual control over the
domains and guiding ultimately the eventual success of the Restoration.21 These lower
samurai, who were once considered a “parasitic” feudal institution in the late Tokugawa
period, recovered their martial spirit to lead the movement to overthrow the Tokugawa
shogun, to restore the emperor as the actual head of the state,22 and eventually to
democratize Japan as their future goal as they assume the leadership in the domains.
The lower samurai, whose ability to forge a coalition of disparate classes of
people and feudal institutions, were able to “draw their superiors along with them” to the
eventual overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate, thus changing the matrix of leadership
in the feudal domains.23 It was these lower samurai, concludes Norman, who became the
“vanguard of modernization, in the establishment of a modern state in Japan,” by
successfully organizing an unlikely coalition.24

Norman’s book, translated into Japanese, was widely read as a standard work on
the subject in both Japan and the West. Beginning in the mid 1950’s, however, scholars
began to challenge Norman’s basic thesis. Some argue that Norman’s Marxist or
economic class-interest theory is too broad, while others find his definition of the “lower
samurai” not sufficient enough. Still others have suggested that before the Meiji
Restoration there was no single vision of a new polity, much less a blueprint among the

21
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leaders outlining what a post-Restoration Japan was supposed to look like.25
Nevertheless, Norman’s work did stimulate the interests of scholars to conduct more
exhaustive research and to produce more comprehensive studies on the nature of the
Meiji revolutionaries and the causes of the Meiji Restoration.
Sidney Brown was one of the first historians who challenged Norman’s thesis by
concentrating on the life of Kido Takayoshi, who was born the son of a physician but was
adopted by a “substantial samurai” family, attaining eventually higher rank within the
feudal structure of Choshu.26 Far from being stuck as a “lower samurai” in the preRestoration feudal system, Kido’s rise attests to not only the interchangeability within the
class structure, at least as applied in Choshu, but the flexibility within the composition of
samurai rank. In addition, different domains developed their own samurai schools,
which had been established, to educate samurai youths, especially for philosophical and
military training. Kido, Brown points out, attended a Choshu private school that was
considered “the cradle of the Revolution of 1868.”27 Kido, then, was able to elevate his
social status through his adoption to a samurai family and attendance at this domain
school. Kido, who later emerged as one of the leading revolutionaries, was not one of
these typical lower samurai whom Norman considers as the molders of the Meiji
Restoration. Moreover, as Marius Jansen argues in his Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji
Restoration (1961), that it is problematical to generalize a local revolutionary
phenomenon in one domain to be a nation-wide trend.28 Not only were the domains
25
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unique in their outlook but the individuals who comprised the nucleus of the Restoration
movement had different motivations and goals concerning the future of Japan even within
one domain.
Brown further argues that Kido after the Restoration became a “spokesman for
agrarian and feudal classes,” while other revolutionaries sought to dismantle the feudal
state in favor of “a state-patronized industrialization program.”29 The Meiji
revolutionaries, however, Brown admits, were not in full agreement as to how Japan
should move forward after the Restoration. The movement of the revolutionaries to
overthrow the Tokugawa shogunate and restore the emperor, he maintains, may have
been the only immediate and short-term agreement during the pre-Restoration movement.
Many of the revolutionaries after the Restoration agreed to legislate changes that tended
to benefit Japan as a whole rather than benefit their respective domain. Thus, a samurai
need not necessarily travel to the large cities to find an education and to find like-minded
samurai from other domains.
In Choshu, for example, a battle for leadership of the domain between the
conservatives, who wanted to preserve bakufu hegemony, and the radicals led by Kido,
who supported restoration of the emperor, had concluded with the radicals winning the
Choshu Civil War. Brown points out that Kido ended up “serving as chief minister of the
clan,” leading it to eventual victory over the shogunate on the field of battle.30 Norman’s
naming of Kido as an example of the kind of “lower samurai,” upon whose leadership the

29
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Meiji Restoration was dependent,31 is inconsistent with Brown’s more specific account of
Kido’s life, his samurai rank, and his actual contribution to the Meiji Restoration.
Later in the same year, Yoshio Sakata and John Hall also challenged the
interpretation advanced by Norman. They believe that like Norman “Marxist historians
who have based their analysis on the deterministic theories of economic change and class
struggle” have too often relied upon “overly general concepts or upon a single cause to
the exclusion of others.”32 For a more systematic analysis of the Restoration, they
demand that a historian must “utilize multiple ‘levels of conceptualization.’” 33 Outlining
all of the historical methods that had been attempted to analyze the Meiji Restoration
(narrative, economic, comparative, and general), Sakata and Hall suggest that “a more
systematic approach” is necessary to comprehend such an historical event by attempting a
middle ground or a synthesis combining many attributes of narrative and general
history.34
Utilizing this systematic approach, Sakata and Hall try to identify “the
participating agents in the political process” of the Meiji Restoration.35 They argue that
the impoverishment of the lower strata of samurai and peasants, for example, was a result
of the restrictions placed on the feudal lords by the Tokugawa shogunate, not the policy
of the feudal lords to arbitrarily tax the lower samurai and peasants at higher rates or that
they wanted to take their land; the feudal lords had no other option. In short, Sakata and

31
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Hall criticize historians such as Norman for not having fully investigated all of the
preceding causes of specific events to ascertain their effects accurately.
Disputing the specific argument put forward by Norman that it was the “lower
samurai class” who engineered the Meiji Restoration, Sakata and Hall point out the need
to examine “the degree of social heterogeneity” among the revolutionary samurai as a
whole. They argue that many of the samurai who led the Restoration movement had the
“ability to manipulate the political and military forces” within their own domains.36
Samurai like Kido, they insist, were already in positions of authority in the lead up to the
Restoration. So how could they be classified as “lower samurai?”
The ronin, those samurai who had detached from their daimyo for economic
reasons and then traveled to the cities in search of economic opportunity, were actually,
Sakata and Hall emphasize, shishi (men of high purpose) who, through their political
conviction of anti-foreignism, detached themselves from their daimyo in order to agitate
for this objective. In other words, the ronin Sakata and Hall are highlighting already
possessed a political agenda and did not leave their domain for economic reasons. Thus,
these formerly loyal samurai were already “shishi who had become ronin, not ronin who
became shishi.”37 In their investigation of the nature of the revolutionaries, Sakata and
Hall admit that court nobles like Sanjo Sanetomi and upper samurai domain councilors
like Goto Shojiro all had a hand in the success of the Meiji Restoration. They also give
special credit to Katsu Rintaro, a bakufu naval bureaucrat, who convinced the shogun,
Keiki, to resign his post to avoid a civil war.38 A systematic approach to history,

36

Ibid., 33.
Ibid., 44.
38
Ibid., 49.

37

14
covering as many individuals as possible, and investigating the causes of each event, the
authors insist, will give any historian the ammunition they need to explain its effects.
Kee-Il Choi argues that it was the Tokugawa bakufu itself that made a major
contribution to the success of samurai and daimyo plans and strategies in the Meiji
Restoration. A “built-in mechanism,” Choi insists, like the sankin-kotai system instituted
by the bakufu, was designed to force the daimyo to be under strict control of the bakufu.
Choi points out that when the daimyo were performing their sankin-kotai duties traveling
to the bakufu capitol of Edo every other year, it unwittingly produced many unexpected
chain reactions, political, economic, and social, and turned out to be a most important
factor in undermining the Tokugawa equilibrium.39
The policy of keeping the daimyo weak so the bakufu could maintain its
hegemony was upended when the daimyo and their samurai entourages began observing
the weaknesses in the Tokugawa system as a whole. Still not strong enough to threaten
the bakufu militarily, the daimyo waited with vigilant hostility for an opportunity to
present itself.40 The opportunity came with the sankin-kotai system itself, which had
brought hundreds of thousands of samurai to Edo, comprising half of the population of
this largest city in the world, and Osaka,41 where they gathered every other year to
criticize the bakufu and talk about the possibility of revolution.42
The communication and travel network set-up as a result of sankin-kotai, insists
Choi, made it easier for Western ideas of technology and philosophy to flow back and
forth from the samurai in Edo to his daimyo back in his domain. After Perry’s Western
39
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“invasion” in 1853, many samurai, at first very anti-foreign in their ideas, began to
appreciate this technology of the West. More importantly, the military advantage that the
Western nations held over the Tokugawa bakufu, presented an opening to its overthrow
that the daimyo and samurai needed.
The bakufu, attempting to adapt to this show of force from the West, began
sponsoring diplomatic travel to the West to learn its ways. National schools were
established in Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto, to encourage men of ability, no matter their rank
or class, from everywhere in Japan, to come study the ways of the world, stimulating the
competition between the individual domains and the bakufu.
Choi points out that the daimyo initiated a search for talent among their samurai
retainers to exploit the weaknesses of the bakufu, while simultaneously encouraging them
to learn entrepreneurial business and military ideas from the West. A new young breed
of educated lower samurai would employ Western ideas to successfully compete with the
bakufu. 43 It was at this time, that more domain schools were built than in any previous
time.44
The prevailing samurai principle of absolute loyalty to the daimyo, aided by their
worldly knowledge gained in these schools, helped cement the tie between the samurai
and the daimyo,45 and they joined in their mission to modernize and, ultimately, outprogress the bakufu.46 The lower rank samurai, Choi argues, were the harbinger of a
fledgling industrial program in Japan. By their demonstrated talent in Western learning
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gained in the domain school system, the samurai gradually became part of their new
domain leadership.
The built-in mechanism of the sankin-kotai system, which unintentionally
spawned a new entrepreneurialism, Choi reminds us, was the forerunner of a Japan that
sought to progress to the ways of the West by means of industry. In order to train these
up and coming industrialists, the daimyo had built schools, or sent their samurai to the
cities to be trained. These newly educated and enlightened men, far from remaining
static in their lower samurai rank, rose to become domain leaders, eventually to help
carry through the overthrow the Tokugawa shogunate.
Choi explains that with all of the military and financial pressure the bakufu
applied to the daimyo, their answer was to seize an opportunity presented by the Western
nations in their threat to the hegemony of the bakufu. By building schools, the daimyo
encouraged young minds to explore and exploit the knowledge of the West. Choi admits,
that as a result of the bakufu and daimyo talent searches, a new leader, the samurai of
lower rank, came to light.47
The built-in mechanism was not necessarily the sankin-kotai system itself, nor
was it the reaction by the daimyo and their samurai retainers to the trade invasion of the
West, an invasion that weakened the bakufu and gave strength to its enemies. This
mechanism that ultimately gave strength and initiative to the daimyo and the intelligent
young samurai that soon emerged was Tokugawa feudalism, a hegemonic political
system that educated its indigenous population, but could not adapt militarily and
ideologically to the ways of the West. The kind of entrepreneurial initiative that could
adapt to a changing Japan was that taken up by the domains. It was the Tokugawa feudal
47
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system, Choi summarizes, that unwittingly unleashed an ideological environment in
Japan from which it never recovered and from which its entrepreneurial daimyo and
samurai leaders could emerge.48
Choi points out that among the generation of samurai who sought the overthrow
of the Tokugawa bakufu, the restoration of the emperor, and the setting up of the Meiji
government, it was the older and more experienced revolutionaries born before 1833, like
Kido, Okubo Toshimichi, and Saigo Takamori, who led these movements. The next
generation of samurai revolutionaries born between the years 1834-1841, like Okuma
Shigenobu and Ito Hirobumi, “were path breakers in various fields in the modernization
of Japan” after the Restoration. The coeval of samurai born after 1841 eventually
became the national leaders in business and cultural pursuits49 as much as a decade after
the Restoration. Though there is some overlap in the age brackets, it would be difficult,
Choi admits, to assign the same motivations or even the same ranks to every samurai
who played a part in the multi-faceted revolution during the Meiji Era. Thus, labeling the
Meiji leaders “lower samurai,” as if they were all motivated to fight for the same purpose
is to ignore their specific individual roles, contributions, and achievements during the
many stages of the Meiji Era.
Three years later, Roger Hackett tries to present an alternative view on the nature
of the Meiji revolutionaries. His brief biography of Nishi Amane, a young samurai who
became a Tokugawa bureaucrat, discusses how Nishi, a gifted student in his domain
school, was assigned by the bakufu government to learn the secrets of a foreign
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civilization.50 Not only were the domains sponsoring schools of learning but the bakufu
was beginning to recruit bright young samurai of talent from all over Japan. The
bakufu’s search for talent bore fruit as they began to travel to the shogunal capitol to
enhance their education. Nishi, born the son of a court physician in Tsuwano domain,
was selected to be educated at his domain’s school, a privilege generally accorded only to
the sons of samurai. He was soon recognized for his ability in the literary and military
arts, and as a result, he was sent to Edo to further his studies.51 While in Edo, Nishi
learned the Dutch and English languages so quickly that he was further tasked by the
bakufu to attend the Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books, which taught such
subjects as statistics, law, economics, political science, and foreign diplomatic relations.52
Hackett points out that Nishi recognized the valuable contribution of foreign
learning to the bakufu. The Tokugawa shogunate’s internal enemies, the tozama daimyo,
their samurai vassals, and the ronin, had come to discover the bakufu’s reluctance to
defend Japan from foreigners, as evident when Tokugawa was forced to open trade to the
United States in 1854. When some of the domains hostile to the bakufu began applying
pressure on the bakufu to expel the foreigners, the bakufu, too weak militarily to compete
with the West, began trying to find ways to learn of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Western nations.53
For this endeavor, the bakufu recruited bright young men, even from hostile
domains, to study Western politics, philosophy, and military techniques. In order to
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maintain its hegemony over Japan, the bakufu would be willing to do anything, even the
promotion of Western learning. The bakufu’s motive to finance programs for Western
learning, Hackett argues, may have been to eventually rid Japan of Westerners. The
bright young samurai, who were eager to learn about the politics, diplomacy, and
philosophy of the West, on the other hand, did become inspired to apply their newly
acquired knowledge in the Japanese political arena. Nishi, however, chose to pursue his
personal goals of the modernization of the Japanese nation by working for the bakufu.
The Tokugawa shogunate needed to implement new military techniques to resist
the West, and that is where Nishi’s training in languages proved most effective. Sent to
Europe in 1862 to translate Dutch naval strategy and to purchase ships to build up its
navy, the Tokugawa bakufu discovered upon his return in 1865 that Nishi had acquired
proficiency in military defense techniques and strategy. Pressured to teach at the new
military academy in Edo, Nishi set about hiring faculty, setting up curricula, and
recruiting cadets from all over Japan. Emphasizing the military and liberal arts, this
model was adopted by the domain military schools that soon sprang up,54 teaching
samurai of all backgrounds about Western military techniques.55
For many samurai seeking to learn about the West, these schools became
commonplace in the Japanese countryside, and they provided the intellectual setting for
the revolutionaries to adapt Japanese techniques to Western methods. Hackett points out,
however, that for many revolutionary samurai wishing to excel in these Western
techniques, there were peaceful and intelligent samurai like Nishi who imparted this
knowledge to these revolutionaries, who used it as a means to eventually challenge the
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Tokugawa bakufu. This up and coming Japanese intelligentsia, Hackett argues, as
advocates of Westernization years before a movement to overthrow the Tokugawa bakufu
even gained momentum, were important “agents of change” both before and after the
Meiji Restoration. “Transformers” like Nishi,56 were the samurai forebears of the
revolution that gave impetus to the revolutionaries in their drive to overthrow the
Tokugawa shogunate.
Contributing to the scholarship on the nature of the Meiji revolutionaries in the
same year as Hackett, Joyce Lebra focuses on another samurai trained by the Tokugawa,
Okuma Shigenobu, who, just like Nishi, became an intellectual revolutionary while
studying and working for the bakufu. Naomasa Nabeshima, the tozama daimyo of Hizen,
was, like Nishi’s daimyo, hostile to the bakufu, Born in a family of “middle” samurai
rank, Okuma studied the Dutch and English languages in schools founded by the
Tokugawa shogunate.57 And it was from this Western learning that Okuma would later
develop his political philosophy of imperial restoration while a member of a radical, proimperial Hizen domain society, the Gisai domei.58 A post-Restoration proponent of
political parties, public speeches, and British style parliamentary government, Okuma is
best remembered in Japan as the man most responsible for promoting the idea of
convening Japan’s first Diet59 and for founding Waseda University in Tokyo in 1882.
Norman has emphatically argued that the leadership of the revolutionaries
consisted of “lower samurai,” and he included in that assessment, Okuma Shigenobu.60
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Jansen agrees ever so little with Norman’s opinion, pointing out that Okuma did fall out
of favor with his own domain’s high officials for his pro-imperial stance. To become
alienated from the other samurai in ones domain might give one pause to reflect on the
values and goals of the leadership within the domain. In turn, this might drive a young
samurai to reject the privileges once conferred upon him by his domain and become a
ronin. Okuma, however, rejected the ronin lifestyle and would later become involved
with high domain officials like Goto Shojiro, councilor to Yamanouchi Yodo, the daimyo
of Tosa.61 The inter-domain coalition formed among the samurai of all ranks and in
some cases their daimyo are more representative of the ideal Japanese revolutionary than
those who Norman believes remained relatively static in their lower samurai class and
idealism. To relegate these revolutionaries to a faceless “lower samurai” class, as has
Norman, ignores the individual contributions of “middle samurai,” like Okuma who, as
Jansen points out, quietly organized coalitions of samurai from all backgrounds to fulfill
their collective desire to implement a more revolutionary Japanese polity.
Albert Craig also disputes Norman’s proposition about the characterization of the
Meiji revolutionaries coming from the “lower” samurai class and maintains that
Norman’s reference to them as “lower samurai” is absurd.62 When categorizing samurai
in Choshu, Craig questions Norman’s postulate; he does not clearly define the term or
how it applied to individual samurai revolutionaries. One must first distinguish between
the forty different ranks that comprise the term “samurai.”63 There were “upper” shi
samurai like Kido Takayoshi and “lower” sotsu samurai like Ito Hirobumi, which by
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itself has twenty-three grades of rank. Some samurai, even those considered “upper” shi
samurai in Choshu, received stipends comparable to “lower samurai” in other domains.64
Craig suggests that it would be a distortion to use the term that connotes a single class
“united by common economic and political frustrations and bent upon turning the
tradition in their domains and the nation upside down,”65 because the many samurai who
did contribute to the Meiji Restoration came from many different backgrounds. Craig’s
bottom line is that the Meiji Restoration was not led only by “lower samurai.”66
That is not to say that there were no “lower samurai” who were key contributors
to the Meiji Restoration. They were not necessarily the leaders of the Meiji Restoration
but leaders of local militias who supported their more senior military leaders like Kido.
Ito Hirobumi, for example, ascended from plebeian origin to the samurai rank in
Choshu,67 clearly demonstrating the fluidity of the rank structure in feudal Japan, not the
permanent station of a lower class of samurai as Norman states. As a soldier or lower
class sotsu samurai, Ito led a militia unit during the 1864 Civil War that sought to replace
the “conservative,” pro-bakufu leadership in Choshu.68 Ito demonstrated his ability to
lead military detachments by recruiting commoners and other men of ability (not men of
traditional rank), a revolutionary concept in Japanese military warfare, to fight in this
civil war. These militia units were essential to Choshu’s decisive contribution to the
Meiji Restoration. It was only after the Restoration that Ito would rise within the newly
implemented Choshu and national political rank structure, contributing significantly to
the modernization and democratization of Japan.
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Far from being stuck as a plebeian in the feudal rank structure, Ito was selected
for his ability, an ability that was recognized by his samurai superiors. By being
recognized for his potential as a revolutionary supporter of the Meiji Restoration, Ito did
not supersede his samurai superiors outside the domain rank structure, but he was
rewarded by his superiors for his exceptional ability within the guidelines of traditional
domain politics.
Norman also advocates the alienated ronin, who sought political change outside
of the traditional domain political structure, became educated, and returned to their
domains as leaders of the Restoration movement. Jansen, in his Sakamoto Ryoma (1961),
describes such a samurai, who closely fits the profile of this type of revolutionary. Born
into a family of goshi (farmer) samurai,69 Sakamoto’s radical anti-foreign politics,
attracting the attention of his daimyo, forced him to flee for his life from Tosa to become
what Norman would describe as the prototypical ronin. He would eventually become a
leading proponent of radical assassination plots against Tosa and bakufu officials,70 until
he had a life-changing experience.
Sakamoto was in the act of assassinating a bakufu official, who in turn persuaded
him to change his mind. Sakamoto became ashamed of his zealous actions and
eventually asked Katsu Rintaro, a high-placed bakufu naval commander, to become his
mentor.71 Katsu guided Sakamoto to become a constructive member of the Restoration
movement by working with other ronin, and even loyal samurai and daimyo from other
domains, to take heed of the advanced military technology of the foreigners. Schooled in
Tosa as a young samurai, Sakamoto left to continue his education in Edo where he
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learned of Perry’s trade mission and developed his anti-foreign stance.72 Through
Katsu’s pro-Western urging and advice, Sakamoto would eventually develop and run a
private shipping company sponsored by Satsuma domain,73 which funneled arms to
Choshu in its defense from a bakufu punitive expedition.
A typical lower-class ronin highlighted by Norman, Sakamoto had managed to
bring to the negotiating table the hostile tozama daimyo of Satsuma and Choshu,
brokering an alliance between the two that was the anchor of the successful multi-domain
military force that eventually overthrew the bakufu and restored the emperor.74 Pardoned
by his domain for his forward-looking diplomatic accomplishments, Sakamoto became a
trendsetter among samurai of all ranks, and one of the most influential lower samurai
leaders of the Restoration movement.
Sakamoto’s about-face from reactionary to intellectual leader illustrates that under
the guidance of a bakufu mentor, he changed his opinions mid-stream to become an
intellectual guiding force for the Restoration. Sakamoto might never have had the
opportunity to lead the Restoration movement, unless Tosa’s social mobility policy
allowed lower class clan members to acquire samurai rank.75 Credited with drafting a
pre-Restoration document, the Eight-Point Plan, proposing an outline for a peaceful
solution to avoid the upcoming Restoration Civil War, lenience towards the bakufu, and
democratic political reforms,76 Sakamoto, once a fervent anti-foreign and anti-bakufu
zealot, became an intellectual and inclusive revolutionary, emerging as the moderate
exception to the single-minded and anti-bakufu “lower samurai” example championed by
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Norman. Sakamoto’s attempts to change the Tokugawa political system by alienating
himself from the feudal structure, along with the cheap intimidation of officials, proved a
failure as he was relegated to the role of a meaningless and ineffective fanatic. Only by
seeking alliances with the more influential samurai, daimyo, and even bakufu officials,
was Sakamoto able to affect meaningful leadership and substantive change into a new
Japanese polity.
The expositions of the alleged inconsistencies, in the works discussed above,
seem to have closed the book on Norman’s grand and generalized theory, as the debate
went silent for the two or three decades following the publication of Jansen’s Sakamoto
Ryoma (1961), but the issue has not been resolved as a new interpretation is important for
a full understanding of the Meiji Restoration and its leaders.

To what extent could Norman’s thesis withstand the challenges and criticisms of
later historians? To state succinctly, Norman’s argument is that the overthrow of the
Tokugawa bakufu was achieved through the combined anti-Tokugawa forces, led by
lower samurai and ronin, particularly of the powerful southwestern domains, Satsuma,
Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen, with full cooperation of the imperial court nobles (kuge) in
Kyoto and supported by the rich merchants of Osaka and Kyoto. Among these groups,
all of which played integral, essential parts, it was the lower samurai who assumed the
leadership during this revolutionary change.
As we have seen, subsequent scholars, concentrating on specific events and the
individual careers and motivations of major leaders of all types and examining them in
depth, have come up with different conclusions. Focusing on limited, narrow topics but
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altogether working on a wider sampling and more diverse leaders, they have revealed that
the Meiji leaders were not primarily lower class samurai nor were they necessarily class
motivated.
By so doing, most of these scholars have shifted the focus from the earlier
Restoration leaders to the later Meiji leaders, who occupied important positions in the
new government, and from the lower class to the middle class samurai. As Brown points
out, Norman’s thesis does not explain how samurai, like Kido, rose within his domain’s
feudal power structure to ultimately guide its contribution to a successful conclusion to
the Meiji Restoration. Hackett’s study on Nishi and Lebra’s work on Okuma, as well as
Brown’s Kido, all argue that these revolutionaries were not really considered “lower
samurai.” Especially convincing is Craig’s study on Choshu, maintaining that major
Restoration leaders came not only from the “lower samurai” class but from many
different backgrounds. Upward social mobility was commonplace in the domains as the
daimyo sought talented and intelligent men of ability to help compete with and ultimately
defeat the Tokugawa bakufu. Sakata and Hall further argue that the degree of social
heterogeneity among the revolutionary samurai as a whole demonstrates how they were
not relegated to a permanent underclass, thus, undercutting Norman’s premise that the
motivation for the mass movement of these revolutionaries was economic.
Moreover, many of those who were lower samurai during the Restoration like Ito
and Okuma, some historians argue, did make valuable contributions to the success of the
movement, but they did not lead it, due largely to their young age. These inconspicuous
lower samurai followed the example of their feudal superiors, the daimyo and shishi, who
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were by far more influential than the former. It was only after the Restoration that these
lower samurai gained importance and began to agitate for further modernization.
These lower samurai, however, were not the main subject of Norman’s study.
What Norman is talking about are young “lower samurai” who played a significant role
in the Restoration itself. As if to advance Norman’s theory, Choi proposes his
generational approach to distinguish the two generations of the “lower samurai:” the
older and more experienced revolutionaries born before 1833 and the new generation of
samurai born between 1834 and 1841. Norman’s “lower samurai” certainly belong to
Choi’s first generation of samurai. The most prominent of these revolutionaries were
Kido, Sakamoto, Nakaoka Shintaro, Saigo, Okubo, and all of the heirs of Yoshida Shoin,
a loyalist teacher specializing in military instruction in the Choshu domain.
As Norman abundantly demonstrates, these lower samurai worked effectively
with the rich chonin, their daimyo, their counterparts in other domains, the bakufu, and
the court nobles in Kyoto, especially Iwakura Tomomi. Many important agreements
were made between domains through their endeavors. Perhaps the most crucial
agreement was made in 1866 between Satsuma and Choshu (traditionally enemy
domains) by the efforts of Sakamoto and Nakaoka of Tosa. In the same year, Kido of
Choshu and Saigo of Satsuma agreed that Satsuma would provide its help in mediating
for Choshu at court and that both domains would work together for “the glory of the
Imperial country.” It was also Saigo, who forced Edo, defended by the bakufu official
Katsu Rintaro (Kaishu), to surrender in the spring of 1868.
Norman’s work on the revolutionaries, which was published some seventy years
ago, continues to be vital, despite various attacks from all sides. His key concept of the
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“lower samurai,” however, needs to be more fully refined. Norman’s lack of specificity
regarding the identities of the Restoration samurai calls into question the thoroughness of
his work, inducing recent scholars to misunderstand his work. He does not, for example,
seem to imply, as later historians insist he does, that his “lower samurai,” a large number
of nameless people in many domains, were the ones who, led by class or economic
motivation, had instigated the revolution as a class struggle. Such misinterpretations are
prevalent among many recent historians. Even Jansen in his book on Sakamoto Ryoma
goes so far as to point out that “it is problematic to generalize a local revolutionary
phenomenon in one domain to be a nation-wide trend.” Norman, however, does not
appear to have intended to conduct such a comprehensive study. His objective is to
affirm a group of specific lower class samurai from a small number of particular domains.
His “lower samurai,” therefore, were not representative of the lower samurai in
the late Tokugawa feudal society. They were, instead, an incredibly small number of
samurai, drawn from a few, influential domains, such as Satsuma, Choshu, and Tosa.
Norman should also have emphasized the fact that these men were not only small in
number but exceptionally gifted and well versed in Western civilization as a result of
their training in the “Dutch Learning” programs in Nagasaki, Osaka, Edo, and their own
domains, which had established private schools.
Norman should, furthermore, have asserted more strongly the fact that these
“lower samurai” were remarkably young men, ranging from twenty-seven to forty-one,
and the significance of their “lower samurai” status. Coming from relatively poor
backgrounds, these samurai, in fact, grew up in the atmosphere of a rigid, regimented,
hierarchical feudal society and witnessed, from their early childhood on, the suffering and
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hardship their fathers (lower samurai) had to go through. They developed little
emotional feeling and sentiment for the feudal system and came naturally to regard
feudalism not only as detrimental to individuals and society but as “their fathers’ mortal
enemy” and became determined to eradicate it. Through clever manipulation, persuasion,
and steadfastness, these exceptionally talented men with strong self-assurance took the
opportunity to establish for themselves, their domains, and their country a new society,
where all the constraints of feudal rules and structure would be eliminated.
All the weaknesses, notwithstanding, Norman’s study still remains fundamentally
sound. Although the samurai who contributed to the Meiji Restoration did come from
many different backgrounds, it is Norman who singles out a group of leaders from the
lower samurai class who instigated the Restoration and played a crucial role in it.
Eventually, the generational change forced the Restoration leaders, such as Kido,
Okubo, Saigo, and Sakamoto, to be swept away, like the outdated bakufu had been, and
the younger more progressive generation, who did not even participate in the Restoration,
like Nishi and Okuma, or played only minor roles in it, like Ito, assumed the mantle of
leadership and began to control the new government. But the generational shift was not
the only force preventing them from participating in the Meiji government. To occupy
important positions in the new government was not the major concern of these
revolutionaries. By then, they must have realized that their mission had already been
fully accomplished.
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